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COMMENTS
REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY-A MATTER OF
DISCRETION OR DIRECTION?
JAMES S. FORD
I. INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Dissolution of Marriage Act' in 1971,
the Florida legislature for the first time statutorily provided for the
awarding of rehabilitative alimony. The enactment, sometimes re-
ferred to as the "no-fault" divorce act,2 was hailed as creating a
"new day," transforming husband and wife into "tru[e] partners in
the marital venture sharing equal rights and obligations."'
Laudable though it may have been, the statute was deficient in
that it contained no indication of what the rehabilitative alimony
concept was to embody or what criteria were to be used in making
the determination of which type of alimony to award.4 It was left
to the courts "to construe the term [rehabilitative alimony] by ref-
erence to its ordinary definition and common usage. ' 5
An attempt to remedy the ambiguities the trial courts faced oc-
curred in 1978 when the statute was amended to enumerate certain
factors which a court may consider in reaching its final determina-
tion of an award.' The addition of these factors, which did nothing
1. Ch. 71-241, 1971 Fla. Laws 1319 (current version at FLA. STAT. ch. 61 (1983)).
2. The passage of the dissolution act followed the then-current legislative trend of states
to eliminate or at least diminish the importance of fault in the dissolution process. See
Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference?, 14
FAM. L.Q. 141, 147-48 (1980).
3. Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719, 725-26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
4. The statute stated in part: "In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may
grant alimony to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or permanent in nature."
FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) (1971).
5. Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541, 543 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
6. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (1983) provides:
In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the court shall con-
sider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties.
(d) The financial resources of each party.
(e) Where applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient
education or training to enable him or her to find appropriate employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not limited to,
services rendered in homemaking, child care, education and career building of the
other party.
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more than codify the principles the courts had established since
the Act's passage, did little to abate the haze surrounding the reha-
bilitative alimony alternative. The statute still failed to adequately
define the rehabilitative alimony concept or to give guidance as to
when it is the appropriate award. Furthermore, courts continued to
establish conflicting rules of law despite the amendments.
Much of the judicial dissonance, however, can be attributed to
the tremendous amount of discretion vesting in the trial court and
not solely to the lack of adequate guidelines in the statute. It is the
interplay between the legislative direction and the judicial discre-
tion in dissolution cases that is the topic of this comment, using
the recent case of Kuvin v. Kuvin 7 as an example. The discussion
focuses primarily on the conflict between awarding permanent ali-
mony versus rehabilitative alimony, while recognizing that these
are not the only dissolution remedies available. 8
In Kuvin, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the proposition
that, as a rule of law, a wife with a capacity for self-support who is
awarded custody of minor children but desires to forego rehabilita-
tion and remain at home has a right to do so if her former husband
can afford to support her.9 The decision presents the issue of what
effect a spouse's desire to remain at home to care for minor chil-
dren should have on the type of award.10
Before that issue can be explored, it is necessary to lay the
groundwork for discussion by way of a review of the following: 1)
the criteria to be used in determining the type of alimony to be
awarded; 2) the discretion afforded a trial judge in making that
determination; and 3) the scope of review afforded appellate
courts. This analysis will be accomplished by a survey of the perti-
nent cases and the enunciation of guidelines distilled from those
cases.
The case most relevant to a discussion of alimony in Florida is
7. 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1983).
8. For a discussion of special equity and exclusive possession of property, see Duncan v.
Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980).
9. According to a study of one county in central Florida, the wife received child custody
in 98.47% of the cases. White & Stone, A Study of Alimony and Child Support Rulings
with Some Recommendations, 10 FAM. L.Q. 75, 82 (1976).
10. Although the court referred to a husband supporting a wife, Florida's dissolution
statute is gender-neutral. See FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) (1983) (providing the court "may grant
alimony to either party"). See, e.g., Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). See
generally Note, Alimony for Men-The Changing Law, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 687 (1979).
Hence the spouse making this claim could be a father rather than a mother. See Ruhnau v.
Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61, 64-65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
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the watershed 1980 case of Canakaris v. Canakaris."1 This opinion,
an attempt by the supreme court to bring some clarity to the area,
defined and differentiated the various types of alimony.1 2 It also
established the "reasonableness test" for review of a trial court's
use of discretion.'3 Canakaris remains the single most important
case in the area of alimony for Florida practitioners.
II. REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY V. PERMANENT ALIMONY
We do not construe the marriage status, once achieved, as con-
ferring on the former wife of a ship-wrecked marriage the right
to live a life of veritable ease with no effort and little incentive
on her part to apply such talent as she may possess to making
her own way.
Justice B.K. Roberts14
The concept of alimony, which can be traced to the English ec-
clesiastical courts, was originally an effort to enforce the husband's
continuing obligation for support of his wife.' 5 The English courts
did not allow the dissolution of the marriage but rather granted a
divorce from "bed and board," referred to in contemporary terms
as a legal separation.' 6 Even after the separation occurred, the hus-
band retained control of his wife's property and income which he
acquired upon entering the marriage. Thus, he also retained the
responsibility for the support of his spouse."
American law adopted the English practice of granting alimony
incident to divorce, without regard to the fact that American
courts did allow for absolute dissolution rather than mere separa-
tion. 8 The awarding of alimony was traditionally based on several
factors, such as whether the husband had committed "adultery,
cruelty, desertion or some other marital misconduct," or whether
11. 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
12. Id. at 1200-02.
13. Id. at 1203.
14. Kahn v. Kahn, 78 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 1955).
15. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 2, at 146.
16. Id. A legal separation is not permitted in Florida: "No dissolution of marriage is
from bed and board, but is from bonds of matrimony." FLA. STAT. § 61.031 (1983).
17. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 2, at 146.
18. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 421 (1968). With the exception of a private Act of
Parliament available to the aristocracy, an absolute divorce was not available in England
until the Divorce Act of 1857. Vernier & Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony
Law and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 198 (1939).
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the wife was an "innocent spouse."'19 However, with the advent of
no-fault divorce statutes, 20 some form of which now exists in all
but three states,2' the justifications for alimony began to change.
According to one commentator, "alimony is now reserved for those
[ex-spouses] who cannot support themselves. '22 In Florida, this
support may take the form of rehabilitative alimony, permanent
alimony, a lump-sum payment, exclusive possession of property, or
any combination thereof. 23
It is important to bear in mind that Florida law neither man-
dates alimony nor specifies which spouse shall receive it. Rather,
the dissolution statute gives the court the discretion to "grant ali-
mony to either party. ' 24 Contrary to what has been called "the ali-
mony myth," alimony is only awarded in a small percentage of di-
vorces.25 One study indicates that alimony was awarded in only
twenty-four percent of the divorce cases in two Florida counties
between 1971 and 1974.26 Other studies reach similar conclusions.27
The Divorce Act of 1828 provided that the court shall make such
allowance for alimony to the wife "as from the circumstances of
the parties and nature of the case may be fit, equitable and just."2
Early Florida courts interpreted this language to base alimony
awards on the needs of the wife and the husband's "pecuniary
means to supply that necessity. '2 9 These two elements are still
19. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 2, at 146.
20. Under Florida's no-fault divorce statute, the relative "guilt" or "innocence" of the
parties is irrelevant. The previous fault-oriented grounds for divorce are replaced with a
requirement that the marriage be "irretrievably broken" or that one of the parties be men-
tally incompetent. FLA. STAT. § 61.052 (1983).
21. As of April 1, 1982, only Illinois and South Dakota still limited divorce to traditional
fault grounds. Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 16 FAM. L.Q.
289, 315 (1983). Texas is the only state which fails to provide for alimony altogether (absent
a contractual provision calling for it). Id. at 340.
22. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 2, at 148.
23. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980). The court was careful to
point out that determination that a spouse is entitled to a "special equity" is not considered
alimony. Special equity describes a vested interest in property brought into the marriage or
acquired during the marriage through a contribution of services or funds over and above
normal marital duties. Id. at 1200.
24. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) (1983) (emphasis added).
25. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 2, at 142.
26. Id. at 143 n.6.
27. Other studies suggest that the figure may be as low as 14% in some parts of the
country. Id.
28. See FLA. STAT. § 65.08 (1941).
29. Haddon v. Haddon, 18 So. 779, 780 (Fla. 1895). See also Jacobs v. Jacobs, 50 So. 2d
169 (Fla. 1951); Welsh v. Welsh, 35 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1948); Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112 (Fla.
4th DCA 1972); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 189 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966).
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cited by the courts-although now in gender-neutral terms-as a
basis for assessing the propriety of an alimony award.30
Once a court has made the threshold determination that grant-
ing alimony in a given case is appropriate, the court must decide
which type of alimony is proper. This would be a simpler task if
the legislature had written into the statute which cases warranted
which type(s) of alimony. While a statutory scheme setting forth
the appropriateness of a particular type of alimony in a certain
situation is conceivable, it is not feasible. There are far too many
differing factual situations for any fixed classification system to be
practical. Moreover, any such system would rob the courts of the
broad discretion necessary to truly achieve equity between the par-
ties.3 1 Thus, the ideal statute, while providing guidelines and con-
siderations, must leave to the courts adequate discretion to do jus-
tice between the parties.2
A. General Principles for Determining the Type of Award
1. Capacity for Self-Support
Although the concepts upon which rehabilitative alimony is
based were recognized as early as 1955 by the Florida courts, they
were not codified until 1971. In Kahn v. Kahn"s the Florida Su-
preme Court first explained the rationale for continued support of
the wife by the husband: "[U]ntil recent years, a divorced wife had
little prospect of being able to work and earn a livelihood, and it
was essential to a well-ordered society that she be appropriately
maintained by her estranged husband so that she would not be-
come a charge on the community."'" The court then explained the
role that changing societal factors would play in the alimony scena-
rio, foreshadowing the coming of rehabilitative alimony:
30. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201. In Whitehead v. Whitehead, 189 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1966), the district court recognized that the trial court had erred in failing to consider
factors other than the wife's need for support and the husband's ability to provide it. In
Whitehead, the wife was awarded $610 per month permanent alimony. At the time of the
marriage the wife was 21 years old and had been earning $300 per month. The marriage
lasted less than four days. The district court reversed, holding that the court below should
have considered the wife's age, health, education, and demonstrated ability to earn a liveli-
hood, as well as the short duration of the marriage and the minimal change in her circum-
stances. Id. at 401.
31. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1200.
32. See FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (1983), which provides: "The court may consider any...
factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties."
33. 78 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1955).
34. Id. at 368.
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Times have now changed. The broad, practically unlimited op-
portunities for women in the business world of today are a matter
of common knowledge. Thus, in an era where the opportunities
for self-support by the wife are so abundant, the fact that the
marriage has been brought to an end . . .does not necessarily
entitle the wife to be forever supported by a former husband who
has little, if any, more economic advantages than she has.35
Rehabilitative alimony has been deemed appropriate "in those
situations where it is possible for the person to develop anew [or]
redevelop a capacity for self-support. ' ' 36 This support "should be
limited in amount and duration to what is necessary to maintain
that person through his [or her] training or education, or until he
or she obtains employment or otherwise becomes self-support-
ing."" Thus the principal purpose of rehabilitative alimony "is to
establish the capacity for self-support of the receiving spouse."38
While the transitional support principles embodied in rehabilita-
tive alimony are changing the duration, amount, and type of ali-
mony awards, permanent alimony has not been eradicated. 39 If, af-
ter a dissolution, a spouse is incapable of self-support or too old or
unable to be retrained, that spouse is entitled to an award of per-
manent alimony.' The First District Court of Appeal in Cann v.
Cann 1 defined permanent alimony as "an allowance for the sup-
port and maintenance of a spouse during his or her lifetime. Its
purpose is to provide nourishment, sustenance and the necessities
of life to a former spouse who has neither the resources nor ability
to be self-sustaining."' 2
Given that the purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to establish a
capacity for self-support and that the purpose of permanent ali-
mony is to sustain those who lack a capacity for self-support,
courts should begin with the presumption that rehabilitative ali-
mony will take precedence when it has been established that the
attainment of self-support is possible on the part of the receiving
35. Id.
36. Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541, 543 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
37. Id.
38. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1202.
39. Herbert v. Herbert, 304 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). The dissolution statute
still explicitly authorizes an award of permanent alimony. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) (1983).
40. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 2, at 149.
41. 334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
42. Id. at 329 (emphasis added) (quoting Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th DCA
1972)).
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spouse. The First District in Roberts v. Roberts43 interpreted the
new legislation as a mandate, stating, "[I]f the spouse has the ca-
pacity to make her own way through the remainder of her life
unassisted by the former husband, then the courts cannot require
him to pay alimony other than for rehabilitative purposes. 44
Other courts opt for greater discretion and do not see the pre-
sumption in favor of the award of rehabilitative alimony as a man-
date at all. For example, the Fourth District Court of Appeal holds
the view that a capacity for self-support does not require a "ritual-
istic incantation" of the rehabilitative alimony principle. 4 Thus, it
is not clear in Florida that the presence of capacity for self-support
requires an award of rehabilitative alimony. The converse, how-
ever, is clear-an award of rehabilitative alimony requires the
presence of capacity for self-support.
In Ruszala v. Ruszala,46 the Second District Court of Appeal re-
versed an award of rehabilitative alimony to an ex-wife who was
legally blind, who could not drive or read except with great diffi-
culty, who qualified as totally disabled under social security, and
whose only work experience was that of a waitress some fifteen
years earlier. The court pointed out that "[riehabilitative alimony
presupposes the potential for self-support. . . . Without this ca-
pacity there is nothing to which one can be rehabilitated. ' '47 These
facts clearly demonstrated a situation where permanent alimony
was called for, keeping in mind that, ideally, permanent alimony
should be awarded when a spouse is incapable of self-support or
retraining.
Using capacity for self-support as the determinative factor, a sit-
uation where permanent alimony clearly was not called for arose in
43. 283 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973) (district court held it was error for trial court to
award permanent alimony where the husband's earnings from his business and navy retire-
ment pay were no greater than his wife's own earnings from her well-established
employment).
44. Id. at 397. The First District later softened this view to some extent in Quick v.
Quick, 400 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In Quick the lower court awarded rehabilitative
alimony, and the district court in upholding that decision implied that an award of perma-
nent alimony would have been upheld as well. In fact, the appellate court found the chan-
cellor's decision not to award permanent alimony "problematic" yet within the range of
discretionary alternatives under the circumstances. Id. at 1298-99. This equivocation could
have been in part a response to the "reasonableness" standard of review set forth in
Canakaris.
45. Herbert, 304 So. 2d at 466 (district court held that the lower court should not have
terminated an award of permanent alimony where the petition alleging a substantial change
in circumstances only requested a reduction in payments).
46. 360 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
47. Id. at 1289 (quoting Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)).
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the case of Peck v. Peck.48 The wife in Peck was a licensed medical
doctor who had been practicing for twenty-five years at the time of
the dissolution. She had a substantial earning capacity and was
able to support herself "by almost any standard."4 9 The court held
that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award per-
manent alimony. The most the wife could be awarded would be
rehabilitative alimony, but only for a short period to afford the
wife an "adequate opportunity to adjust to her new
circumstances. 50
Another situation where permanent alimony would be wholly in-
appropriate would be where the spouse has not only the capacity
for self-support, but also the desire to be self-supporting. In the
case of Cann v. Cann the court suggested that an award of perma-
nent alimony in such a case would be a violation of public policy.
2
Between these two well established extremes, where there is pa-
tently no capacity for self-support and where there is obvious ca-
pacity for self-support, lies the vast majority of cases, and hence
the conflict. Few cases fit neatly into one fact pattern or the other;
thus the courts have the difficult task of determining to which side
the facts will tip the scale.
2. Elements of Self-Support
Another factor adding to this conflict is that capacity for self-
support cannot always be isolated as the one determinative crite-
rion. The dissolution statute allows the court to consider any factor
"necessary to do equity and justice between the parties. '5 3 Leaving
this aside for the moment and assuming that capacity for self-sup-
port is the predominant factor, it is still necessary to determine
what constitutes a capacity for self-support. The statute provides
that the court shall consider "[tihe age and the physical and emo-
tional condition of both parties; [t]he financial resources of each
party; [and] [w]here applicable, the time necessary for either party
to acquire sufficient education or training to enable him or her to
48. 291 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). For the consideration of factors other than
capacity for self-support, see infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
49. Id. at 213. The evidence showed she was capable of earning $30,000 per year.
50. Id.
51. Cann, 334 So. 2d at 329-30. The court held it was error to award permanent alimony
where the wife was in good health, had a bachelor's degree in English, was employed prior to
the marriage, and had both the capacity for self-support and the desire to be self-support-
ing. Id.
52. Id.
53. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (1983).
REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY
find appropriate employment."54
In West v. West,55 the Fourth District reversed an award of re-
habilitative alimony and ordered an award of permanent alimony
to a fifty-seven-year-old wife (who had not worked during the
thirty-five-year marriage) because there was no evidence in the
record indicating a potential or actual capacity for self-support.56
In the absence of facts presented to the court regarding education,
financial resources, health, or employment potential, the court had
no choice but to strike down the award of rehabilitative alimony.
On the other hand, where it can be shown that the recipient spouse
is young, in good health, and qualified in a profession, an award of
rehabilitative alimony is proper.5 7 Consistent with this view, the
court in Hair v. Hair upheld an award of rehabilitative alimony
where the wife was relatively young, of high average intelligence,
and-by the wife's own testimony-indicated a "capacity for inde-
pendence and initiative."5'
The absence of any one of these factors (youth, good health, ed-
ucation, and marketable skills) does not necessarily trigger the
grant of permanent alimony. As the court in Volosin v. Volosin 9
noted, despite the fact that the wife in that case was sixty-one
years old, if the evidence demonstrated that the wife could reason-
ably be expected to become self-supporting, then an award of reha-
bilitative alimony should be approved. The court took into consid-
eration "the totality of the evidence."'
In reviewing an award of rehabilitative alimony to a fifty-five-
year-old wife, the Second District in Jassy v. Jassy"' commented
that courts ordinarily think of rehabilitative alimony in regard to a
younger spouse. However, in view of the spouse's good health and
considering the increased longevity of the female sex the court con-
54. Id. § 61.08(2)(c)-(e).
55. 345 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
56. Id.
57. Parks v. Parks, 407 So. 2d 304, 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The appeal was not predi-
cated on the contention that it was error to award rehabilitative alimony but rather that the
award given was inadequate.
58. Hair v. Hair, 402 So. 2d 1201, 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
59. 382 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
60. Id. at 735. The court determined that where the wife was 61 years old, in questiona-
ble health, had few financial resources, and had presented herself as a poor candidate for
employment, she was entitled to an award of permanent alimony. The court stated that age
alone would not be sufficient for the awarding of permanent alimony, if the wife had been
shown to have a capacity for self-support. Id. at 736.
61. 347 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
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cluded the award was an appropriate one.62 The court also consid-
ered that the wife intended to work towards a business/finance de-
gree and that she had the potential to achieve that objective.
To reiterate the point in Volosin, if, in light of all the relevant
factors the spouse can be shown to possess a capacity for self-sup-
port or a potential for that capacity which can be developed
through retraining, then an award of rehabilitative alimony would
be proper .6 No longer will the mere fact that a spouse is of ad-
vanced age, or suffers from a physical infirmity, or lacks training in
a marketable skill be conclusive standing alone. Hence, for an
award of rehabilitative alimony to be inappropriate, there should
be evidence that one of these factors, or a combination thereof,
renders the spouse incapable of becoming self-supporting. Such a
case was Goss v. Goss, 6 4 where the Fourth District ruled that per-
manent alimony rather than rehabilitative alimony should have
been awarded to a wife who was fifty-two years old, had an elev-
enth grade education, and who had not worked during her twenty-
nine-year marriage. After filing for dissolution, the wife had been
denied employment with nine different employers and had to set-
tle for babysitting or sewing positions which produced only meager
income. The appellate court also cited evidence that she was in
poor health-suffering from a bad back, high blood pressure, and
nervous conditions.6 5
Similarly, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Holland v. Hol-
land6 held permanent alimony was appropriate where the wife
was forty-three years old, had a tenth-grade education, and had no
marketable skills or talents. While her health was generally good,
her only employment had been as a telegraph clerk prior to her
marriage of sixteen years. The court reversed the award of periodic
alimony and remanded for a hearing on the amount of permanent
alimony to be awarded the wife "upon reexamination of the par-
ties' needs and abilities. '67
62. Id. at 480.
63. Arguably, if the spouse already has the capacity for self-support then even an award
of rehabilitative alimony is improper, since the purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to de-
velop that capacity. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. However, as the court in
Peck noted, it may be necessary to award a spouse rehabilitative alimony to allow him or
her to adjust to the new circumstances. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
64. 400 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
65. Id. at 519.
66. 406 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
67. Id. at 499. For cases with similar fact patterns, see Reisman v. Reisman, 314 So. 2d
783 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (rehabilitative alimony improper where wife had never been gain-
[Vol. 12:285
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A synthesis of these cases supports the proposition that capacity
for self-support is determined by a consideration of the requesting
spouse's age, physical and emotional state, potential for employ-
ment, and financial resources68 in light of the totality of the cir-
cumstances. The significance of the evolvement of the totality of
the circumstances standard is that no single factor can be consid-
ered dispositive unless extraordinary in nature. Consequently,
counsel for each party must broaden their focus on the background
and prospective future of the alimony-seeking spouse. Once the
court has made the determination of whether a capacity for self-
support exists, it then must decide if other factors should be taken
into consideration.
B. Consideration of Other Factors
1. Standard of Living
After a showing that a wife earning $3,627 yearly as a part-time
teacher would not be able to obtain a full-time position, and there-
fore was unable to become self-supporting, the Second District in
Thomas v. Thomas 9 went on to consider the fact that the wife's
standard of living would be substantially lower than she had en-
joyed during marriage. The previous award of rehabilitative ali-
mony was reversed in favor of permanent alimony. The court eas-
ily could have rested its decision on the finding that there was no
capacity for self-support but chose to introduce the "standard of
living" factor into its determination. The court held that the hus-
band should be required to supplement the wife's earnings so long
as he has the means to do so and there was no substantial increase
in her earning potential.7 0 The implication is that the husband is
obligated to support the wife (or vice versa) at a standard to which
she had become accustomed during the marriage.
Other courts have also given credence to the standard of living
fully employed and had sustained a permanent neck injury), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 107
(Fla. 1976); Dash v. Dash, 284 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (improper to award rehabilita-
tive alimony where the 55-year-old wife had no history of employment, was in poor health,
and the standard of living of the parties was high).
68. In Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), the court held it was error to
award even rehabilitative alimony where no rehabilitation was contemplated, and the wife
possessed a separate intangible estate consisting of $163,000 in stocks and bonds, $1,800 in
savings, and a one-third interest in a $28,000 mortgage and received the husband's interest
in the marital home as lump-sum alimony.
69. 364 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
70. Id. at 79.
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factor. The Third District Court of Appeal expressly includes stan-
dard of living in its determination of an alimony award.7 1 Simi-
larly, the Fourth District in McAllister v. McAllister placed con-
siderable weight on the standard of living factor, stating that trial
courts "must allow a wife to continue with some semblance of her
former standards. '72 The trial court in McAllister awarded the
wife $6,000 per year as permanent alimony with an additional $500
per month for five years as rehabilitative alimony. The husband,
who engaged in a glamorous lifestyle, 3 was a successful physician
who had a gross income of $200,000 annually. The appellate court,
noting the financial disparity which would exist between the par-
ties if the award were upheld, eliminated the award of rehabilita-
tive alimony and increased the award of permanent alimony to
$1,000 per month.74 The court seemed unimpressed that the forty-
eight-year-old, able-bodied wife was a former pharmacist and held
a degree in anthropology, suggesting that a wife is entitled to per-
manent support from her husband regardless of her ability to sup-
port herself.
With the 1978 amendment of Florida's dissolution statute, the
standard of living factor was expressly added to the list of criteria
a court must consider in determining a proper award of alimony."'
71. See, e.g., Forster v. Forster, 436 So. 2d 966, 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Hawkesworth v.
Hawkesworth, 345 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
72. McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The court in
McAllister outlined the following comprehensive list of nine factors to be considered in
making an alimony award:
1) The ability of the husband to pay;
2) the needs of the wife compared to reasonable expectations from her own
income;
3) the standard of living enjoyed by the wife during marriage;
4) the length of the marriage;
5) the number of children;
6) the relative health and physical condition of both the wife and the husband;
7) the extent of the contribution by the wife to her husband's successful career;
8) the conduct, or misconduct, of the parties during the marriage; and,
9) a catch-all to avoid the spouse from experiencing a gross change in financial
circumstances. Id. at 354-55.
73. The court seemed disturbed by the fact that the husband's lifestyle was so glamor-
ous. He enjoyed elk hunting in Wyoming, dove shooting in Mexico, fishing, skiing, and vaca-
tioning in places such as the Bahamas, Canada, and Europe. The court stated that the
award given by the trial court would "hardly discomfit his lifestyle by more than the sacri-
fice of one elk hunting trip to Wyoming a year," whereas the wife would be "devastated"
and "left with little but her memories." Id.
74. The court reasoned that to rule to the contrary "would require society to re-classify
the traditional all-American concept of Mom and apple pie and re-label it a most hazardous
occupation that all young girls should be dissuaded from." Id.
75. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2)(a) (1983).
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However, ambiguity, rather than clarity, persists because the stat-
ute lends itself to the following four possible interpretations: 1)
these are factors to be used in making the initial determination of
whether alimony is to be awarded at all; 2) these are factors to be
used in determining the type of alimony to be awarded; 3) these
are factors to be used in determining the amount of alimony to be
awarded; 4) these factors serve all three purposes, to be used inter-
changeably depending on which question needs to be resolved. The
statute provides no guidance as to which of the four interpreta-
tions the legislature intended, and the courts have failed to unravel
the confusion. They generally refer to the statute as being the ba-
sis of their decisions but give scant suggestion as to how the stat-
ute was discerned.76
The Florida Supreme Court has twice indicated that the parties'
standard of living should be considered when determining the
amount of permanent alimony to be paid." This lends support to
the theory that standard of living is an appropriate consideration
after the determination of type has been made, but not necessarily
before. It would make no sense to consider standard of living with
regard to an award of rehabilitative alimony since its purpose is to
provide the spouse with funds to develop or redevelop a capacity
for self-support, thus making the divorcee financially independent
from the former spouse.
Notwithstanding this hypothesis, an argument can be made that
standard of living should be considered in determining the type of
award. If the standard of living during the marriage was high, as in
McAllister and Firestone, and one spouse has contributed to the
education or "career building" of the other party,"8 it would seem
inequitable to consider only the spouse's capacity for self-support.
A court faced with such a situation could award rehabilitative ali-
mony to allow the dependent spouse to become self-supporting to
a degree and thereafter award permanent alimony in an amount
76. At least one court has suggested that the criteria are used to determine the type of
award. In Lynch v. Lynch, 437 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), the court stated it was using
the criteria in § 61.08(2) to determine whether the trial court properly awarded lump-sum
alimony. Id. at 236-37. Another court has suggested that the criteria are used to determine
both type and amount. Vandergriff v. Vandergriff, 438 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
(Smith, J., concurring and dissenting).
77. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201-02; Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972)
(this decision predated the 1978 amendments to the Florida dissolution statute regarding
the standard of living criterion).
78. One of the factors listed in the statute is the contribution of one party to the "career
building of the other party." FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2)(f) (1983).
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necessary to allow the spouse some semblance of his or her lifestyle
during marriage. The court, to achieve a more equitable dissolu-
tion, could also consider lump-sum alimony or exclusive possession
of property as compensation for services during the marriage.
2. Duration of the Marriage
In addition to standard of living, the current statute lists the
duration of the marriage as a factor for the court's consideration.7 9
This factor falls prey to the same defect as does the standard of
living factor-for which determination is the factor to be used? In
Hawkesworth the Third District asserted that duration of marriage
is a consideration for determining the type of award, stating that
rehabilitative alimony is more appropriate where the marriage is of
short duration.80 Presumably, it follows that permanent alimony
would be more appropriate where the marriage was of long dura-
tion. This argument has appeal. Where the wife has spent years as
a homemaker and mother, bypassing her own career aspirations, it
seems equitable that she receive some recompense in the form of
continued support after dissolution. However, this would seem to
disregard the rationale behind rehabilitative alimony and the rec-
ognition by courts of the changing norms in society towards equal-
ity and independence. In either situation, there is still ambiguity
surrounding the proper use of these factors.
C. Other Important Aspects of Rehabilitative and Permanent
Alimony
As pointed out in Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, the word "permanent" in
permanent alimony does not necessarily mean "forever. '81 As a
general rule, permanent alimony is terminated upon the death of
either spouse or the remarriage of the receiving spouse. 2 Once
awarded, it is subject to modification upon a substantial change of
circumstances and may be converted to rehabilitative alimony;
conversely, rehabilitative alimony may be converted to permanent
alimony.83 This rule embodies one significant distinction between
79. Id. § 61.08(2)(b).
80. Hawkesworth v. Hawkesworth, 345 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
81. Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61, 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). The word "permanent" is
used to distinguish it from that type of alimony known as temporary alimony, which is
support from the time of separation until the date of the decree. Duss v. Duss, 111 So. 382,
384 (Fla. 1926).
82. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1202.
83. Id.
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rehabilitative alimo~iy and permanent alimony-the manner by
which it is terminated.84 Rehabilitative alimony automatically ter-
minates at the end of a fixed period established in the final judg-
ment or by such subsequent order as may modify the period,
whereas permanent alimony requires a showing of a "substantial
change in the circumstances" to be terminated.85
Any award of alimony may be in either periodic payments or
payments in lump sum or both.80 If permanent alimony is granted,
the court may choose to modify the award if the paying spouse can
show changed circumstances.87 Also, rehabilitative alimony and
permanent alimony may be awarded concurrently."8 Importantly,
although no regard is given to fault in granting a dissolution, the
court "may consider the adultery of a spouse and the circum-
stances thereof in determining whether alimony shall be awarded
to such spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be
awarded."'
III. DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE SCOPE OF REVIEW
Discretion without a criterion for its exercise is authorization of
arbitrariness.
Felix Frankfurter"o
The field of domestic relations in general, and alimony in partic-
ular, inures to a "freer rein" of judicial discretion than probably
any other area of the law. 1 Such a large degree of discretion is
considered essential in order to do equity between the parties. As
stated in Canakaris, "Dissolution proceedings present a trial judge
with the difficult problem of apportioning assets acquired by the
parties and providing necessary support.192 To accomplish this, the
trial judge possesses broad discretionary authority, 93 defined as
84. Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325, 329 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
85. Id.
86. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) (1983).
87. Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577, 579-80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (citing Garrison v.
Garrison, 351 So. 2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)).
88. See, e.g., McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
89. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) (1983).
90. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 496 (1953).
91. Cooey, The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Alimony, 6 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 213, 213 (1939).
92. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1202.
93. Id. See also Bosem v. Bosem, 279 So. 2d 863, 864 (Fla. 1973); King v. King, 271 So.
2d 159, 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Weston v. Weston, 251 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
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"[t]he power exercised by courts to determine questions to which
no strict rule of law is applicable but which, from their nature, and
the circumstances of the case, are controlled by the personal judg-
ment of the court."9 ' Such deference to the trial court's discretion
is justified because the establishment of strict rules of law would
be "impossible . . . for every conceivable situation which could
arise in the course of a domestic relation proceeding." 95 The rea-
soning is that the trial judge is in the best position to determine
what is just and appropriate because he has personally observed
the parties, heard the testimony, and witnessed the events of the
trial. The trial judge sits at a "superior vantage point" to that of
the appellate courts, which have only the bare trial record to
review.96
It is readily apparent that broad discretion is essential, but ques-
tions necessarily arise as to the limits of this discretion, what con-
stitutes an abuse of discretion, and what is the scope of review for
appellate courts. The Canakaris decision is helpful. Attempting to
establish some parameters with regard to the breadth of discretion,
the Florida Supreme Court stated that a trial court's discretionary
power is not without limitation. 7 Evidently, the only limitation is
a prohibition on substantial disparities in judgments resulting
from basically similar factual patterns. The standard is further re-
fined by the requirement that there be "logic and justification for
the result." 98 The trial court is not to exercise its discretionary
power "in accordance with whim or caprice . . . nor in an inconsis-
tent manner."99 The court suggested, in citing to a treatise by Jus-
tice Cardozo, that trial courts are bound to some extent by prece-
dent and analogy to other cases. 100 Likewise, attorneys can look for
guidance to the run of cases bearing a similarity of facts and the
factors discussed infra.
Yet, despite the pronouncement of these limitations, the court's
discretion remains inordinately broad, as evidenced by the stan-
dard on review. In order for an appellate court to reverse an ali-
mony award of a lower court, it must be shown that there was an
(quoting Sommers v. Sommers, 183 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)).
94. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1202 (citing 1 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE EN-
CYCLOPEDIA 804 (8th ed. 1914)).
95. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1202.
96. Id. at 1202-03.
97. Id. at 1203.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921)).
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abuse of discretion.10' The Canakaris court adopted the "reasona-
bleness test" for determining when an abuse has occurred:
Discretion, in this sense, is abused when the judicial action is
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of say-
ing that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would
take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could
differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court,
then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.' 0 2
To effect a reversal on appeal, there can be no question but that
the trial court's action was improper. This is a deferential test in-
deed. Seemingly, it makes the possibility of reversal almost nonex-
istent. While the award of rehabilitative alimony to a blind, dis-
abled spouse with little work experience, as in Ruszala v.
Ruszala,10 3 presented an obvious example of a view "no reasonable
man would take," the majority of cases are not so clear-cut.
In Forster v. Forster'" the Third District failed to even mention
the reasonableness test in reversing the trial court's award of reha-
bilitative alimony. Instead, because the wife had been "short-
changed" (based on the district court's findings), the trial court's
order constituted an abuse of discretion. 0 5 In Besley v. Besley, e06
decided by the Third District two months after Forster, Judge
Baskin in his dissent admonished the majority for reversing the
trial court's decision without stating a reason and thus designating
itself as the factfinder. Judge Baskin urged that the district court
should have affirmed the trial court's ruling because no abuse of
discretion was demonstrated. 0
7
101. Smorag v. Smorag, 400 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The challenging party has
the burden of proof of abuse of discretion. Baker v. Baker, 299 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 3d
DCA), cert. denied, 307 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1974).
102. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1203 (citing to Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124 F.2d 965, 967
(9th Cir. 1942)).
103. 360 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
104. 436 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
105. Id. at 967. The Third District wavers between adherence to and disregard of the
reasonableness test. Compare Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
(reasonableness test expressly applied) with Weiner v. Weiner, 386 So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla.
3d DCA 1980), rev'd, 403 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1981) (district court held an award of permanent
alimony of $750 per week was an abuse of discretion in light of the sums of money the wife
was accustomed to spending during the marriage; Florida Supreme Court reversed, stating
that no abuse of discretion had been shown and that district court had "improperly substi-
tuted its judgment for that of the trial court," id. at 409).
106. 437 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
107. Id. at 247 (Baskin, J., dissenting).
19841
302 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:285
The Third District cases rely heavily on whether the spouse has
been, in the court's opinion, short-changed, 0 8 rather than on
whether the decision was one with which no reasonable man could
agree. In Griffin v. Griffin,109 decided the same day as Forster, the
court upheld an award of lump-sum and rehabilitative alimony
where the parties had been married for less than three years, evi-
dently concluding that the wife had not been short-changed.
Other districts cite and follow the reasonableness test. For exam-
ple, the Fifth District in Hair v. Hair stated, "It is not necessary
that we agree with the trial court, only that we find that reasonable
men could agree with him, in order to affirm." 10 Other districts
cite to Canakaris in asserting an abuse of discretion, but do not
follow the reasonableness test outlined therein. The First District
in Golden v. Golden"' reversed an award of rehabilitative alimony
on the basis that the wife of the twenty-three-year marriage had
only a tenth-grade education, was in poor physical condition, and
had, at her husband's wish, devoted her married life endeavors to
him and their children and home. Based on the factors listed in
the dissolution statute and the general principles outlined earlier,
there is a compelling argument that the trial court should have
awarded permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony. Judge Joa-
nos, in his dissent, argued that the lower court had not abused its
discretion as measured by the Canakaris reasonableness test. He
reviewed the medical evidence and the evidence relating to the
wife's employment potential and concluded that reasonable men
could conclude as the trial court had,." 2 The majority made no ref-
erence to the reasonableness test.
In sum, the majority of cases reveal that, ordinarily, the reasona-
bleness test is not the basis for reversal of trial court orders despite
the Florida Supreme Court's mandate that it be the only basis for
finding an abuse of discretion."1 '
Both the Fourth and Fifth Districts, in Wagner v. Wagner 14
108. The term "short-changed" was coined by the First District in Brown v. Brown, 300
So. 2d 719, 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). In this pre-Canakaris case, the district court set aside
the trial court's alimony award and declared it a "pittance" of the assets accumulated dur-
ing the marriage.
109. 436 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
110. Hair v. Hair, 402 So. 2d 1201, 1205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). But see Hinebaugh v.
Hinebaugh, 403 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
111. 395 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
112. Id. at 1256 (Joanos, J., dissenting).
113. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1203.
114. 383 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
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and Hair respectively, have circumvented the reasonableness test
by asserting that the decision to award permanent or rehabilitative
alimony is a question of law and not a matter of discretion. There-
fore, these courts conclude, the review of such a decision is not
subject to the reasonableness test. This analysis, if correct, would
permit appellate courts to reverse a trial court's decision on the
basis of rules of law rather than solely for abuse of discretion.
However, the Florida Supreme Court in Kuvin v. Kuvin settled
this question in holding that the decision whether to award perma-
nent or rehabilitative alimony is a matter within the trial court's
discretion, impliedly rejecting the analyses of the Fourth and Fifth
Districts.118
IV. THE Kuvin IssuE
Alimony was never intended to secure a perpetual state of se-
cured indolence. It should not be suffered to convert a host of
physically and mentally competent young women into an army
of alimony drones, who neither toil nor spin, and become a drain
on society and a menace to themselves.
Samuel Hofstadter. 1"6
The issue presented on appeal in Kuvin was "whether the wife
may choose to remain at home as a full-time mother or must 'reha-
bilitate herself' by working outside the home. '117 The parties in
Kuvin were married in 1968 and had two minor children at the
time of dissolution in 1980. The husband, a forty-seven-year-old
attorney, had a net income of $49,500. The wife, thirty-six years
old, did not work outside of the home during the marriage except
for a year and a half when she worked part-time as a legal secre-
tary. Mr. Kuvin approved of his wife's decision to remain at home
and not work. The trial court awarded Mrs. Kuvin $1,000 per
month for a period of three years as rehabilitative alimony. The
court also required the sale of the marital home and division of the
proceeds between the parties, with the wife receiving $20,000 from
the husband's share as lump-sum alimony."" Mrs. Kuvin appealed
115. Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. 1983).
116. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1967, at 25M, col. 8.
117. Kuvin v. Kuvin, 412 So. 2d 900, 901 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), rev'd, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla.
1983).
118. Kuvin, 412 So. 2d at 901. The judgment also included the sale of property owned in
Colorado with the proceeds divided, and child support payments of $950 a month to be paid
by the husband. These rulings were not challenged on appeal.
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the judgment on the theory that her husband had approved of her
decision to remain at home during the marriage and was
financially able to continue to provide for his family. The Third
District agreed and replaced the award of rehabilitative alimony
with permanent alimony.119
Perhaps the issue in Kuvin can be best understood by analyzing
the various factors involved and determining the possible awards
based on the statutory guidelines and the principles established by
case law. At the time of the dissolution, Mrs. Kuvin was a rela-
tively young and healthy woman with some postsecondary educa-
tion and a demonstrated ability to hold a job. The evidence
showed that she could earn $250 a week as a legal secretary and
had a $200 monthly income from farm property.120 Based on these
facts alone, an award of rehabilitative alimony would have been
most appropriate. A combination of youth, education, vocational
skill, and demonstrated ability to be self-supportive presents a
textbook case for the award of rehabilitative alimony.
However, a trial judge may choose to consider other factors, such
as duration of marriage and the standard of living to which the
spouse was accustomed. The Kuvin's marriage had lasted the rela-
tively long period of twelve years and their standard of living was
based on the ability to spend approximately $40,000 per year. With
the presence of these additional factors, it is entirely plausible that
a trial judge could rule that permanent alimony should be awarded
in the interest of equity. Although this ruling would conflict with
the holdings of some cases,1"1 it likely would not be held
unreasonable.
The Kuvin case involved the additional factor of the wife's de-
sire to remain at home to care for the children and the husband's
acquiescence to this arrangement during the marriage. The view
that this additional factor favors an award of permanent alimony is
not without precedent. In Ruhnau v. Ruhnau the court upheld an
award of permanent alimony to a mother of four, based on the rea-
soning that "there is no substitute for the guiding hand of a
mother in the rearing of children. . . .We do not now intend, and
never have intended, to discourage the role of a mother by the few
remaining women in our society who are willing to fulfill that obli-
gation and purpose. '  The court recognized that the evidence
119. Id. at 902.
120. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d at 204.
121. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 283 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).
122. Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
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must support the award, and that when considering the evidence
the courts should look at "the whole marital picture" and not limit
themselves solely to economics. "3
Cases following Ruhnau, dealing specifically with the issue of
caring for children, gave even more weight to maternal considera-
tions. Expressly taking into consideration the wife's desire to re-
main in the home to care for children during their formative years,
the court in King v. King reversed an award of rehabilitative ali-
mony and ruled that permanent alimony was more appropriate. 24
Interestingly, the wife in King was relatively young and the mar-
riage was of short duration-two factors which could have sup-
ported an award of rehabilitative alimony.125
In McNaughton v. McNaughton, a case cited to and relied on by
the district court in Kuvin, the Third District held that a forty-
three-year-old mother with no other income or training should not
be required to work to support herself and her children when the
husband had the ability to support them. 126 The husband in Mc-
Naughton, like the husband in Kuvin, had previously approved of
the stay-at-home role of the wife. However, McNaughton, Ruhnau,
and King differ drastically from Kuvin in that the wife in each of
these cases had no independent income or vocational skills. The
wife in Kuvin had both an independent income and a marketable
skill. It is unclear whether the wife's desire to remain at home with
the children, coupled with the husband's approval during marriage,
should override the wife's capacity for self-support, a factor which
ordinarily suggests the award of rehabilitative alimony.
As previously discussed, the courts are split on the issue of
whether a capacity for self-support mandates an award of rehabili-
tative alimony. Given the statutory authority to consider all factors
"necessary to do equity and justice between the parties," the more
convincing argument is that it does not automatically mandate
such an award. As the court in Ruhnau said, "Alimony is not de-
termined by some iron clad formula that can be applied with sharp
certainty. The equities, circumstances and the whole marital pic-
ture furnish and form the fabric from which the award is to be
123. Id. at 65. The court was careful to point out that its statements regarding a mother
and wife are equally applicable to the father and husband.
124. King v. King, 316 So. 2d 322, 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
125. King was a pre-Canakaris case; therefore, the district court in reversing the lower
court's award was not required to follow the reasonableness test.
126. McNaughton v. McNaughton, 332 So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied,
345 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1977).
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cut. ... "127 This is not to say that a showing of potential capacity
for self-support does not present strong evidence in favor of reha-
bilitative alimony. It is only to say that the capacity for self-sup-
port is but one factor to be taken into account among many in
determining an appropriate award. It may carry more weight than
other factors, but it should not be conclusive.
An alternative approach was employed by the First District in
Smithwick v. Smithwick,12 8 a case involving a thirty-eight-year-old
wife who had training and experience as an x-ray technician, but
who had devoted herself full-time to the care of the couple's three
children. Recognizing the children's need for the attention of their
mother on the one hand and the wife's youth and vocational skills
on the other, the court reached the compromise of awarding reha-
bilitative alimony during the period of the minority of the children
and during a reasonable rehabilitative period thereafter.
This same approach was utilized by the Third District in
Dominik v. Dominik.129 Although the wife was fully employable
and capable of earning $800 per month the court awarded rehabili-
tative alimony for a period of ten years to allow the wife to care for
the couple's children.
The cases that have been outlined in this comment suggest that
based on the factors in Kuvin (the wife's youth, independent in-
come and marketable skills, the duration of the marriage, as well
as the standard of living established by the parties, the wife's role
of full-time mother during the marriage, and her desire to continue
that role and the husband's approval of that role), the trial court
could have justifiably awarded either rehabilitative or permanent
alimony or followed the approach of the Smithwick court and
awarded rehabilitative alimony until the youngest child reached
majority.
In Kuvin the Florida Supreme Court flatly rejected the proposi-
tion that a rehabilitatable wife who has been avarded custody of
minor children may choose to forego rehabilitation and remain at
home to care for the children if the former husband can afford to
support her. The court further admonished the district court for
only considering the ability of the husband to pay and not the
needs of the wife.130 The decision to award rehabilitative alimony
was within the trial court's discretion. In order for the district
127. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d at 65.
128. 353 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
129. 390 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
130. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d at 204-05.
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court to reverse the trial court's award, it had to find an abuse of
discretion. The supreme court held that reasonable persons could
differ as to the propriety of the trial court's action, and therefore
found no abuse of discretion.131
Kuvin does not stand for the proposition that, notwithstanding
her desire to remain at home with the children, a wife is entitled
only to rehabilitative alimony if she is rehabilitatable. Rather, the
case holds that she is not entitled to permanent alimony as a rule
of law. Such a decision is within the discretion of the trial court
after a consideration of all the relevant factors.
V. CONCLUSION
As the law now stands, in view of Canakaris and recent cases
such as Kuvin, the decision of the trial court is subject to reversal
only if there is an abuse of discretion as defined by the reasonable-
ness test. The district court is not to substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court.1 32 In addition, district courts will not be able
to avoid the reasonableness test by declaring that the decision
whether to award permanent or rehabilitative alimony is a ques-
tion of law. Kuvin makes it clear that the decision is one within
the trial court's discretion.' 33 In exercising that discretion, a trial
court is guided by the general principles established by case law
and by the limitation that there not be substantial disparities in
judgments resulting from cases with similar facts. There is some
ambiguity as to the purpose the statutory factors are to serve;
whether to determine the type of alimony, or amount, or both. The
better argument is that they serve both purposes, particularly
since the purpose of broad discretion is to achieve equity between
the parties.
In making its determination of an award, the trial court should
initially determine whether there is a capacity for self-support. If
so, the court should give special regard to awarding rehabilitative
alimony. However, a court should not become so enamored with
the virtues of rehabilitative alimony that it reaches an inequitable
result.
The duration of the marriage, the standard of living during the
131. Id. at 205-06. The supreme court speculated that the trial court may have reasoned
that rehabilitation would be more likely if the wife were to begin immediately rather than
14 years later (when the youngest child would reach majority). Id. at 205.
132. Id. at 206.
133. Id. at 205.
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marriage, and the custody of minor children may suggest that an
award of permanent alimony is more proper, notwithstanding a ca-
pacity for self-support. The type of award granted is a "judgment
call" on the part of the trial court, due to its "superior vantage
point."
With this in mind, the Florida Supreme Court has chosen to
limit an appellate court's ability to reverse a trial court to cases
evidencing the most blatant of abuses-those awards with which
no reasonable man could agree. Whatever direction exists in the
law of alimony exists exclusively for the benefit of the trial court.
And, even then, it is not mandated that the trial courts follow that
direction immutably.
On the one hand, allowing such broad parameters creates the op-
portunity for judicial arbitrariness and caprice. On the other, such
deference is considered necessary for the achievement of equity in
an area of law with so many intricate factors. Whichever is the case
in the field of alimony law in Florida, discretion rules the day.
